



MODULE 3

Context Factors for Migration and Forced Displacement

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MODULE AIMS

- To introduce selected concepts of migration sociology to the analysis of migration movements.
- To initiate a discussion about the push and pull factors driving people to migrate or flee.
- To facilitate the in-depth understanding of selected context factors.



LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting matters of migration and forced displacement. → **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To explain the theory and base their research on a body of academic literature.
→ **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To identify context factors for migrants and refugees and describe that the two groups are sometimes in mixed flows. → **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To contextualize push and pull factors adequately by presenting them in journalistic work. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**

Outline

Many factors may impact the move of migrants and refugees from home, of which some are political, social, gender-related, economic, ethnic, cultural, religious etc. Sociologists of migration and forced displacement¹ distinguish between push and pull factors, jointly also known as context factors. Push factors drive people away from home. Migrants are obliged to leave home and/or decide voluntarily to depart whereas refugees are forced to flee from war or persecution in their home country (see Module 2). Pull factors are the incentives that draw people into destination countries. This module builds upon selected concepts of the sociology of migration. It provides an overview of key push and pull factors that uproot migrants or refugees, and here we highlight when migrants and respectively refugees in particular are related to. Some of these factors will be elaborated further in the country case studies (Modules 6-8), the perspectives from Africa (Module 9) and global perspectives (the MENA region, Asia, the Americas and the Russian Federation – see the project portal www.mediaandmigration.com).

Scholarship

Migration is an essential feature of human life, and people have migrated ever since the first human beings made their way out of Central Africa to other continents. In the history of humankind, people have always been on the move, either voluntarily or forced (Bellwood, 2013). Nonetheless, they

¹ For definition of forced displacement, migrants and refugees see Module 2 and the recommended glossaries: (UNHCR, n.d.; EMN, 2018; IOM 2019a)

were often seen as aliens (IOM, 2019a, p. 6).² Until the 20th century, refugees were not an issue on the international agenda; before World War I, they were treated in accordance with national laws as aliens, and no international policy addressed the specific situation of refugees. World War I (1914-1918) uprooted millions of Europeans, many of whom had to seek shelter in foreign countries. The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees was the first legally binding treaty (Kugelman, 2010, para pp. 18-19). As a model instrument, it also dealt with travel documents, personal status, employment, social rights, education, expulsion etc. Forced displacement, human trafficking and slavery in Africa, however, remained non-issues on the international stage until the 1960s. Under imperial and colonial expansion, large population movements of would-be settlers took place, with scant regard for pre-existing lives, cultures, languages, and property holdings and little analysis of this impact.

Scholarship on migration started in the late 19th and early 20th century (Aigner, 2017). According to initial analyses of migration flows by German-British scientist Ravenstein (1876; 1885; 1889), migrants seek to improve their living conditions, especially materially. In the historical context of mass migration from Europe to America in the late 19th century, more than 60 million Germans, Swedes, Irish, Italians, Poles, and many other Europeans migrated to North and South America in search for a better life. Migration theories of the early 20th century focused on the integration of immigrants, perceived as strangers, into the distinctively different cultures of host societies (e.g. Park, 1928). While the immigrant was described as asking for acceptance, host societies were described as seeking loyalty from the immigrant. The process of immigration was modelled as a set of stages migrants were passing through, which also include phases of competition between migrants and host societies, and conflict. Early scholars emphasized the objective of the migrants' full assimilation into the destination society, while ensuing studies also take into account the impact of the migrants' culture on the culture of receiving societies, stressing pluralism and multiculturalism. Also, different ethnic groups were found to have different modes and capabilities of coping with assimilation (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1953).

Only in the mid-20th century did the scholarly focus turn to migrants and their actual motives. Insecurity and perceived deficits in the countries of origin drive people to migrate, in the hope to overcome these deficiencies in the act of migration; but new insecurities emerge upon arrival in destination countries. Different motives impact the decisions of migrants. An important contribution to the debate was made by Lee's model of push and pull factors (1966). As a first systematic attempt to analyse factors impacting migration decisions, Lee distinguished between economic, social, political, religious, personal/family-related and environmental push factors: Lack of jobs, armed conflicts, religious intolerance, famine, and droughts are just a few of the factors pushing those people who can find the resources to make a migration decision and depart from home. Push factors work independently, interdependently or along with pull factors: People migrate to destination countries seeking security, political and other liberties, education, and employment in labour markets that are in

² For definition of aliens, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

need of (high and low skilled) workers. Research has progressively incorporated cultural and social aspects of migration. Research has positioned the study of migration into a global context, emphasized ethnic and cultural pluralism of immigration (e.g. Glazer & Moynihan, 1963) and highlighted the tensions raised by imbalances between societies, fueling a desire to migrate among members of societies perceived as less powerful and prestigious (e.g. Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1970). In a global society, international migration can be a vehicle for upward social mobility, and beneficial for crowded labour markets in countries of origin on the one side, and destination countries in need of labour on the other side (Sassen, 2007). While brain drain may initially weaken sending societies and brain gain benefit receiving societies, circular migration³ may benefit the sending countries where migrants return to home (Constant, 2020, p. 5). Origin countries and destination countries are often connected by historical (colonial) patterns, cultural and ethnic ties, traditional trade relationships, language, religion etc.; together, they form a system of migration, interconnected by financial transactions (remittances) and communication (see sections below). Contacts between members of the sending societies and their compatriots residing abroad in the diaspora may lead to more migration, further facilitated by shrinking distances due to technological achievements (Douglas et al., 1994). The internet and social media enable international migrants to remain closely connected to their networks in countries of origin, reinforcing cases of hybrid identities (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014).



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Participants should focus on their home country and write a 4,000 word-story for the campus media around the research question: What is the history of immigration and emigration in our home country?

- Research at least two academic articles or books on your country's history of migration.
- Describe your country as a place of immigrants and emigrants. In order to collect the necessary data, use the country page of the Migration Data Portal (2020d).
- Make sure to define international migrants both as immigrants and emigrants.
- Interview a local person with experiences as a migrant and weigh her or his experience against the academic literature and the data you collected.

Note: Should students not have so far studied the ethics of reporting, they may not be well prepared to interview migrants. In this case the interviews may be replaced by research of testimonials in the local media/NGOs or by interviewing a representative of a local NGO that deals with migrants (e.g. the IOM).

³ For definition of "circular migration", see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: IOM (2019a); EMN (2018).

Migration and development

Another meta-perspective relevant for the discussion about migration is the role of development. Policymakers often find themselves under growing public pressure to fight the root causes of migration. The implicit assumption is that – along with more favourable trade agreements and economic cooperation – increasing development cooperation and foreign aid has an impact on migration: Improvements in living conditions may reduce push factors, which in turn reduces migration (Lanati & Thiele, 2017). However, analyses show that development cooperation has ambiguous effects on migration, even if one does not take into account evidence showing that a relevant part of the official development assistance (ODA) does not reach the people but is soaked up by the elites in many countries by way of corruption (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Asongu, 2012). According to some research, the number of migrants leaving a country grows in parallel with growing income and better education, and only decreases once a country has reached a relatively high Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Hence, according to such research, development – at least initially – coincides with rapid increases in migration rates because social and economic development enables and inspires people to migrate (de Haas, 2007). Taking Zelinsky’s (1971) mobility transition theory and the work of Martin & Taylor (1996) as starting points, the impact of development on migration and of migration on development (for instance, through remittances) has been debated for almost fifty years. The buzz word is the “migration hump theory” (Martin & Taylor, 1996).

In line with this thought, development cooperation with low income countries may lead to further migration. Belloc (2011) shows in a survey of 48 sub-Saharan countries that what is often called ‘Overseas Development Assistance’ or ODA “has a positive and statistically significant effect on migration” (Belloc, 2011, p. 187). ODA may stimulate migration as the funds often support the institutions that allow people to build their capacity and thereby find new employment opportunities (educational, business sectors, communication, infrastructure etc.). But “[c]urbing [...] [migration flows] with development policies [in this trajectory] requires triggering unprecedented economic booms in many developing countries” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 32).



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Invite the class to listen to the video statement by Eric Chinje, former AMI president (see project portal www.mediaandmigration.com).


Ask the students to explain the link between migration and development.

North Africa may serve as an example because the majority of people who migrate to Europe originate from North African lower-middle income countries⁴, particularly Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In general, migrants are not among the poorest in their societies but represent those who have acquired the means to realize a migration decision or have been able to raise the necessary funds in their communities (de Haas, 2010a, p. 239). African migrants in Europe have some assets that facilitate their strenuous and hazardous journey: youth, vigour, some funds and the ability to make money in transit, they have friends in the diaspora and make them en-route, sharing contacts and information, and the extended family at home keeps sending money (see section on networks/diaspora below). The smartphone is everybody’s powerful partner.

Migration – “good news”, “bad news”?

The media tend to focus on dramatic incidents in the process of migration. According to one of our comparative studies (for further information on the study and the media coverage about the factors, see Module 4), spectacular boat catastrophes in the Mediterranean Sea involving migrants from Africa have dominated migration coverage in African and European media alike (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Selected main topics of migration coverage by percentage (%) in African and European media outlets



Covering Migration in Africa and Europe: Results from a Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries: N=1,321. Field data, 2015/16. Source: Fengler et al., 2020. Own illustration.


4 See Module 2 for background on these country classifications which are explained in UNDESA (n.d.). As of 2020, all North African countries are lower-middle income countries except for Libya which is upper-middle income (Serajuddinada & Hamadeh, 2020).

Many citizens and policymakers in Africa have long been unaware of the often harsh, and in many occasions inhumane conditions migrants face while being in transit. It was a report by Cable News Network (CNN) about Africans being treated like slaves in Libyan camps which prompted public responses by African leaders during an African Union summit (see Module 5). The media in many African countries also picked up stories about violence in South Africa against migrants from other African countries (Bornman & Cronjé, 2020), especially when compatriots were targeted. Human rights violations and crime against African migrants in the Gulf are still underreported (Best, 2019; Thorogood, 2019).

The media needs to report dramatic incidents like those described above but they don't have to stop there, because beyond the catastrophe, there are stories that provide the public with a broader perspective: What has driven the victims out of their country? What circumstances and realities do migrants face in destination countries? What happens in transit? Ensuing modules provide inspiration on how to find better news angles to provide the public with relevant facts they need to know, how to cope with ethical dilemmas (see Module 10, Module 11), and how to sell migration stories to editors (see Module 13). Push and pull factors impact individual migration decisions and larger migration movements. However, while these factors of push and pull are valuable background knowledge, they seem not to be newsworthy in their own right. This handbook aims to reveal the many newsworthy stories hidden in background knowledge that are just waiting to be unearthed.

Chinyere Stella Okunna, Professor at the Department of Mass Communication, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria:

“The media are largely silent on migration issues, or positive in their reporting of migration, in line with public opinion and government policy on migration, except in extremely life-threatening circumstances such as the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa or the earlier Libyan slave trade scandal. In terms of coverage, the best case is exemplified by the report of the repatriation of Nigerian migrants from South Africa following the recent xenophobic attacks. The human interest report on this matter showed Nigerian returnees demonstrating a high level of patriotism in their emotional chanting of the Nigerian National Anthem when the owner of the Peace Airlines (Mr. Allen Onyema) arrived to welcome the returnees and entered his plane which had brought them home free of charge – causing many of the returnees and Mr. Onyema himself to shed tears of joy and patriotism. Such emotional and patriotic reports could stem the tide of migration out of Nigeria.”



Source: Private.



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Introduce your students to some testimonials, for instance from the website *I am a migrant* (IOM, 2017). Explain push and/or pull factors that may trigger migrants' decision to leave their home countries. After you have shown how to use testimonials to describe these push/pull factors, invite the class to interpret factors that may have triggered migrants' decision to leave their home countries.

Small teams are tasked to:

- choose one testimonial from the website *I am a migrant* (IOM, 2017);
- search for other testimonials of migrants (on institutional websites, national media or from personal encounters).

SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF EVALUATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Ask the class to compile a list of push and pull factors mentioned in these testimonials. Each participant may write a short assessment on the strength of the testimonial, following the questions:

1. Do testimonials help others – for instance yourself – to develop a better understanding of migrants?
2. Do testimonials help migrants to speak out for themselves in your view?
3. Finally, a paragraph will offer some critical thinking on the title “*I am a migrant*”: Does this title support the integration of migrants in their host society or does it rather single them out and stereotype them – should the guiding question rather be *I am not a migrant! I am who I am?*

Spotlight on push and pull factors for *migrants* and *refugees*

It may be eye-opening for students both from Africa and Europe to take a closer look at push and pull factors, as stereotypes and non-coverage may continue to dominate the perception. For example, European migration coverage has long implied that people leave their home countries because of war or conflict (Berry et al., 2015), which is only true for a relatively small proportion of current cross-

continental mobility (see Module 1, Module 9 and sections on conflict, economy, remittances and climate change below). On the other hand, many Africans are unaware of the actual political, economic, social and personal perspectives that migrants encounter in Europe (Zappe et al., 2019).

A few selected push factors may serve as a starting point for the discussion: Even though the economies of many African countries have experienced relatively high growth rates since 2000, and despite a wealth of natural resources (Devarajan & Fengler, 2013; UNDESA, 2005, pp. 90-93; UNDESA, 2010, pp. 125-127; World Bank, 2020a), poverty is still a reality in many African communities, even in countries with economic growth (Wilhelm, 2020). Climate change exacerbates the risk levels through droughts, sea level rise, floods, unreliability in the duration of the rainy season and other factors (Adenle et al., 2017). While many African countries have experienced profound political transformations (Decalo, 1992; Lynch, 2011), various tensions prevail, and countries like Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see Module 7) and others have experienced unrest or civil wars (Alcorta et al., 2020; Moscona et al., 2018; Ottoh, 2018). Inadequate public infrastructure is another push factor as many African citizens are dissatisfied with the quality of education, health care and other public services (energy, internet, transport etc.; World Bank, 2017). Remittances are a considerable development factor and a “proven way of sharing prosperity” (World Bank, 2019, p. 15).

In the near future, demographic developments in Africa and Europe will deeply affect push and pull factors and further aggravate the imbalances between continents. The world population continues to grow and is estimated to increase by two billion⁵ people between 2020 (7.7 billion) and 2050 (9.7 billion); more than half of that growth will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, projected to become the most populous world region by 2062 (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 6). Population growth, the “unstoppable force” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 11), is a prime determinant of migration. A “highly robust increase in immigration pressures” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 31) is being predicted in general, and to Europe in particular, mostly explained by the demographic changes in sub-Saharan Africa and in some MENA countries (Dao et al., 2018, pp. 31-32). De Haas, however, sends a strong reminder of the fact that people do not migrate “because of” population growth but because of other factors (e.g. a sluggish economic growth, high unemployment) that aggravate the effects of high population density (2010b, p. 12). For example, the high population growth in the oil-rich Gulf states with their rapid economic growth rate is not associated with an increase in emigration rates – but, conversely, the low fertility rates in stagnant economies in Eastern Europe correspond with high emigration rates (de Haas, 2010b, p. 12).

Researching migration and forced displacement from Africa to Europe under the human security paradigm, Giménez-Gómez et al. (2019, p. 1797) recapitulate that a combination of push and pull factors influences the mobility of individuals; “in particular, rising political persecution, [...],

5 Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

human rights violations, political instability and civil conflicts” in addition to ethnic conflicts (Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019, p. 1797). It has been widely acknowledged that singular push/pull factors do not sufficiently explain migration and that people are rarely driven by a single factor. The two levels of push and pull work hand-in-hand, and so do the respective factors, reciprocally influencing the get-up-and-go. Correlations between various factors acting in countries of origin, transit, and destination make it difficult to isolate the role of independent drivers. This makes it sometimes difficult at first sight to see who is a migrant and who is a refugee – for instance, refugees who have fled persecution across borders may be exposed to a secondary displacement following natural disasters like storms, floods or else. The correlations between push and pull factors are well documented, for instance economic opportunities versus (vs) challenges, peace vs conflict, protection vs persecution (Docquier et al., 2014; Hooghe et al., 2008). Multidimensionality also applies when the focus is on push factors only: People whose lives are at risk due to political persecution are often also affected by economic insecurities that jeopardize their livelihoods (Braithwaite et al., 2014; Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2017). Hanlon & Christie (2016) see the levels of conflict and instability, coupled with high rates of un- and under-employment, particularly among young people, as a blend of push factors.

Increasing environmental disruptions that reduce people’s resources may also trigger conflict and violence (Raleigh, 2011). Freeman (2017) has researched this correlation for Africa, while Gleick (2014) broke grounds in describing the beginning of the war in Syria as

“the result of complex interrelated factors. The focus of the conflict is regime change, but the triggers include a broad set of religious and sociopolitical factors, the erosion of the economic health of the country, a wave of political reform sweeping over the Middle East [...] challenges associated with climate [change] [...] and the availability and use of freshwater” (Gleick, 2014, p. 331).

Afifi (2011) shows that environmental issues (e.g. droughts, soil degradation, deforestation) significantly aggravate economic insecurity and migration in Niger. Analysing data from 45 sub-Saharan Africa countries between 1965 and 2005, Naudé (2008) points to population growth and environmental pressures, which impact people’s moves through conflict and a lack of employment. Population growth and resource scarcity may trigger conflict over resource security, and increase the pressure to escape (Borderon et al., 2019).

Some context factors stand out – these are particularly economic determinants and conflict as push factors; and peace, respect for human rights and their protection and realization along with better living standards as pull factors. Population growth and communication (journalism, social media, personal communication among migrants as well as with their co-ethnic communities and migratory peers etc.) are cross-cutting context factors of great significance. The ensuing introduction of selected push and pull factors is not intended to be inclusive but it encompasses some

important context factors for migration and forced displacement. For the matter of clarity but in full acknowledgement that they are often mutually dependent, selected context factors are introduced separately.

Population growth

Recalling that de Haas (2010b, p. 12) cautions against looking at population growth as a stand-alone push factor since people do not migrate “because of” population growth but because of other factors (see above), this section highlights some numbers and context. The global population is estimated to grow by two billion people between 2020 (7.7 billion) and 2050 (9.7 billion)⁶. Of these two billion people, 1.5 billion will be from 22 countries globally of which 12 are sub-Saharan African (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 13, Figure 6). Ten of these 12 sub-Saharan African countries are among the least developed countries (UNDP, 2019b, pp. 2-5)⁷. For instance, in the same timeframe (2020-2050), the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is expected to grow from 87 million to almost 200 million, the population of Nigeria is expected to double from 200 million to 400 million, and the population in Tanzania will also double – from 58 million to 129 million; the population of Ethiopia will increase from 112 to 205 million, and Egypt’s population will rise from 100 million to 160 million. As the fastest-growing region in the world, Africa is expected to surpass 2 billion people by 2050, meaning that the population in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to double by then (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 6, Table 1). In 2019, the fertility rate of 36 countries globally was above four births per woman, with 33 sub-Saharan states being part of this group. At 4.6 births per woman, the fertility rate in these countries by far exceeds the global average of 2.5 births per woman (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 23). After 2050, it is expected that Africa will be the only region still experiencing substantial population growth with the number of births increasing despite falling fertility rates (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 24).

While most children are born in Asia, at least in absolute terms, women in sub-Saharan Africa have on average the highest number of children. At the same time, they carry a greater health risk during pregnancy and birth because maternal and infant mortality are higher than anywhere else in the world. Unlike in Africa, the population is shrinking in some countries of Europe and Asia because fewer children are born than are necessary to replace the parents’ generation (Sippel et al., 2011, p. 13).

6 This is according to a medium-variant projection. Note that demographers typically insist that projections are not forecasts, although the UN’s medium variant is commonly used for that purpose. As global population trends are largely driven by fertility, this estimate is also based on the assumption that fertility levels will continue to *decline*. Average lifetime fertility of 2.1 live births per woman is roughly the level required for populations with low mortality to have a growth rate of zero in the long run (UNDESA, 2019a). The replacement level may differ from the average of 2.1 live births per woman (e.g. in Niger it is higher than 3 live births per woman).

7 Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Niger, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Ivory Coast are “low human development” countries, two (Angola, Kenya) are “medium human development”. Egypt, not a sub-Saharan African but an African country, is ranked in terms of high human development (UNDP, 2019a, p. 301). Top non-African countries that will account for the population growth by 2050 are mostly Asian (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) and the USA (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 13, Figure 6).

In particular, the share of young people in the total population in origin countries is often analysed as a significant factor in determining higher emigration rates. UNDESA estimates that the number of international migrants younger than 19 years rose from 29 million in 1990 to 38 million in 2017 (Migration Data Portal, 2020a). Africa has the most youthful population worldwide, which is often celebrated as a “dividend”, and sometimes feared as a “disaster” (Canning et al., 2015). The rapid population growth in Africa poses a conundrum for many African governments. Take education in Nigeria as an example: 16 million people are in the age group for higher education (18 to 22 years) yet the gross enrolment rate in tertiary education was only 10% in 2011 (World Bank & UIS, 2011). Mahabub (2014) explains that the demand for university education grows in line with the population growth but the system does not keep up. The “Demographic Dividend” may only be gained when public policies change with a focus on managing fertility in order to halt or reverse population growth and empower women, leading to smaller family sizes that will allow more investment in health and education per child, a large and well-educated cohort of youth ready for well-paying jobs that have been created in an enabling environment (Canning et al., 2015; Sippel et al., 2011). Some scholars warn of critical stumbling blocks, including governments’ half-hearted political commitments toward rapid fertility decline, the lack of any absorptive capacity of labour markets; discrimination of women and youth; low salaries and poor social protection (Groth et al., 2019). If the demographic dividend is to benefit the growing number of young African people, implementation needs to be instant and tangible. The “roadmap to the demographic dividend” that Sippel et al. (2011) suggest, highlights women’s empowerment, family planning, education, health care, social security, and that there will be “no demographic dividend without jobs” (Sippel et al., 2011, p. 71). For today’s youth in many sub-Saharan African countries, demographic competition severely limits the opportunities. High expectations, when deceived, may be transformed into frustration and produce two possible outcomes: “exit or voice”, that is, migration or protest (Baudassé et al., 2016).

In addition to international migration, population growth also affects internal migration from rural regions to urban locations. By 2050, it is estimated that two thirds of the world’s population will



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Invite the class to watch the 4:48 minutes interview with Dr. Reiner Klingholz, former Director of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, to be accessed on the project portal www.mediaandmigration.com.

Adapt his hypotheses and data to your country or a country of your choice and research the question: How will demographic changes impact migration here? Use the Migration Data Portal to collect country specific data for your argumentation.

live in cities. As urban populations rise, the share of resources for rural populations falls. Electricity, food, water, and housing are redirected to the populous centres. Urbanisation in developing nations is different from urbanisation of most developed nations in that in the former it is not necessarily linked to manufacturing jobs (Beauchemin & Bocquier, 2004; Liddle, 2017; Mountford & Rapoport, 2014; Oucho & Gould, 1993).

Conflict

Conflict has been identified as a significant underlying cause for people who were *obliged* or forced to leave home⁸ (Davenport et al., 2010; Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2017; Hayes et al., 2016). Conflict and violence may strike in any form of real or perceived threats, instability, armed conflict, generalized lack of security, political persecution, civil and ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses, intercommunal clashes or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and it often erupts in times of transition towards a democratic political system (Adebayo, 2012). Examples include the Central African Republic, South Africa and Kenya (Amodio & Chiovelli, 2017; André et al., 2019; Klopp & Zuern, 2007; Vlavourou, 2016), and the two African case studies in this handbook, Cameroon (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004) and Guinea-Bissau (Ferreira, 2004). In a literature review on significant pull and push factors driving asylum-related migration (Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016), the authors also refer to works by Naudé (2010), Schmeidl (1997), and Moore & Shellman (2004; all cited in: Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, pp. 21-22). Naudé found that in sub-Saharan Africa an additional year of conflict raised mobility by 1.7 per 1,000 inhabitants. Schmeidl proposes that different categories of violence or instability lead to different levels of forced displacement (e.g. generalized violence such as genocide, civil war causes most forced displacements). Moore & Shellman use a global sample of countries with data spanning from 1952 to 1995 to conclude that the greater the threat, the higher the number of people who flee. These various risk categories at home may also correlate to the risks people are willing to accept for their escape (Malakooti, 2015). Displacements decrease when political stability and democratic systems are established, and political and civil rights improve substantially (Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019, p. 1816).

The number of people forcibly displaced due to war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order had grown to 79.5 million by the end of 2019. It is the highest number on record and nearly double the 2010 number of 41 million and a significant increase from the 2018 number of 70.8 million. The global refugee population under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR stood at 20.4 million people by the end of 2019 – adding 5.5 million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate, brings the global total refugee population to almost 26 million. In addition to these refugees – who by definition cross international

⁸ For definition of voluntary migration and forced displacement, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (UNHCR, n.d.; EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

borders – many more people are being displaced in their home country. These IDPs were estimated at 45.7 million by the end of 2019⁹ (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 2-3, p. 8).

The two main groups of people forcibly displaced due to conflict under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are refugees and IDPs (not including Palestinians in this particular framing). Several major crises contributed to the massive displacement over the past decade, including those in MENA countries (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen), Asia (Afghanistan, Myanmar), Europe (Ukraine), Latin America (Venezuela, Colombia) and Africa (e.g. Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sahel region, South Sudan; UNHCR, 2020b, p. 6).

By the end of 2019, more than two thirds (68%) of the world's refugees had come from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia, and the majority were hosted by just five countries: Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda and Germany. Reviewing the past decade (2000-2019), only Pakistan, Germany and Iran held a position in the top 10 refugee hosting countries at both the beginning and the end of the decade (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 22); only Germany represents a distant destination for most refugees whereas, usually, geographic proximity is an important factor for people fleeing conflict and persecution: Syrians mostly flee to Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan; in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of refugees in the region nearly tripled in the course of the decade. In any given year of the last decade, three-quarters of refugees or more were hosted by countries neighbouring their home country. The proximity element in refugee movements burdens least developed countries disproportionately, including Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda. Accounting for just 1.2% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they had the least resources available to meet the needs of people seeking refuge (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 22). While neighbouring countries host most refugees, asylum seeking claims are submitted mainly in the USA and Europe (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 38; map 4, p. 45).

Widely underreported is another rapidly growing group – the IDPs. Whereas refugees by definition cross international borders to flee from persecution and/or conflict at home, IDPs are being displaced in their home country and remain under the protection of their governments, even if the government is not able or willing to protect them (UNHCR, 2020d).

Their numbers are also at record levels, and they have rapidly outpaced those of refugees. The numbers of IDPs under the protection of UNHCR increased from 6.6 million in 2005 to 15 million in 2010 and over 43.5 million at the end of 2019. For the past decade, UNHCR reports an IDP population under its mandate of 59 million people but warns that “this figure does not constitute the global number” (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 30), and points to 79 million new displacements between

9 For data, see Module 2. A note on data used here: The UNHCR quotes IDMC data for the number of IDPs (UNHCR, 2020b, pp. 2-3, footnote1).

2010 and 2019 recorded by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). Large IDP populations of concern to UNHCR by the end of 2019 are in Colombia, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 3; map 3, p. 31). “Although forced displacement is a global phenomenon”, the AU’s Commissioner for Political Affairs writes, “it is more pronounced in Africa” (André et al., 2019, p. 7). Conflict and violence are emerging or escalating in many African countries like Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Libya. Many of these conflicts are not new but protracted and long-lasting (UNHCR, 2020b).

A related development concerns those mandated to protect and assist IDP populations: Internal displacement to rural areas was prevalent in the past but increasingly, IDPs move to urban areas. Two out of three IDPs are now in urban or in semi-urban settings according to UNHCR data. This has posed major protection challenges in countries with ongoing conflict in urban areas e.g. Aleppo in Syria, Bangui in the Central African Republic, Tripoli in Libya, or Jijiga in Ethiopia. IDPs live in marginalized and underserved neighbourhoods or informal settlements, among the urban poor, with limited access to safe water, sanitation, education, jobs and else, leaving them highly exposed and vulnerable (André et al., 2019; UNHCR, 2020b).

The figures for displacement associated with conflict and violence call out loudly for urgent action to halt and reverse the trend. Besides political initiatives to support or keep peace, UNHCR pursues three “durable solutions” with voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. Resettlement is the transfer of refugees to a state that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. The UN Refugee Agency laments that “only a small number of States take part in UNHCR’s resettlement programme”, mainly in Northern America, Australia and Europe (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 2, pp. 48ff; UNHCR, 2020c).



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Download a short video – “Who is an IDP?” This video introduces those IDPs under the mandate of the UNHCR (2020d).


Ask the class to use the data sources introduced above (by the UNHCR, and the IDMC) to prepare a 10 minute presentation which describes the IDP movement in your home country (or, if not applicable, in a country of choice).

The leading questions for the presentation are:

1. What numbers of IDPs can be found within this country?
2. Why were they forced to leave home?
3. Can you find disaggregated data by sex and age (women, children, youth)?

Economic factors

Economic factors have consistently been highlighted as a driving force for migration. Scholars from various theoretical vantage points broadly agree that migration decisions are also shaped by the expected (lifetime) return on the investment (Borjas, 1994; Bryceson, 2019; Sjaastad, 1962). Macro-level developments as in globalization with the demands for cheap labour in manufacturing contexts and highly skilled experts in knowledge societies play a decisive role (Adepoju, 2007). Migrants usually hope for better returns on their skills in the country of destination than in their country of origin. Under economic considerations, one underlying assumption is that people move when the financial benefits from migration are higher than those from staying at home and the return on their labour is higher than the investment pooled by the individual migrant, the extended family and community of “investors”. To this end, employment opportunities and wage differentials are important stimulating factors for migration decisions. The relevance of differences in wages and living standards between the migrants’ countries of origin and destination consistently emerge as significant factors in explaining international migration. The capacity of this factor in precipitating migration, however, fluctuates with the migrants’ profile, for instance between highly skilled and lower skilled people (Kuschminder et al., 2012; Neto & Mullet, 1998; Vogler & Rotte, 2000). The Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism or 4M-Initiative shows an overwhelming majority of migrants motivated by economic reasons: 73% of female and 96% of male migrants from West Africa interviewed in Mali and Niger in April 2018 (total of 311 in-depth interviews) mentioned economic reasons for their migration, followed by personal or family reasons, violence, lack of services, and persecution (4Mi, 2018; see Figure 8).



Similar results have been reported by other studies. Afrobarometer found that 75% of potential migrants consider leaving in search for work (44%) or to escape poverty or economic hardship (29%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 14). Kirwin and Anderson (2018) show in their study of six West African countries (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) that economic reasons top the list of motives by a large margin. The publishers of the first African Migration report, AU and IOM, contest the interpretation of these numbers (Adepoju et al., 2020; see Module 9).

Remittances

Remittances¹⁰ – “the new development mantra” (Kapur, 2004) – are the most direct and well-known links between migration and development. They are usually referred to as the money migrants privately send home. They outnumber private capital flows¹¹ and ODA, account for more than three times the size of ODA, and (excluding China) are significantly larger than foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries (see Figure 9). These figures reflect only officially recorded data – “the true size of remittances, including flows through informal channels, is significantly larger” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 4).

Remittances can be explained as an investment strategy not only for an individual but for an entire household or community and as a manifestation of informal contractual agreements between a migrant and her or his extended family and/or community. They invest in the migrant’s journey aimed at finding employment and sending money home. These “informal contractual agreements ensure that all members share the costs and benefits of migration” (Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016, p. 15). An aspect often reported as migrants’ self-sacrifice for their loved ones (Jordan, 2020) is true but altruism as a motive for sending money home is not the whole story (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, p. 15). Remittances also redistribute the gains from successful migration and are a risk diversification strategy for the investing households and communities (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016). Kirwin & Anderson (2018) show with recent data that jobs and remittances are prime reasons for migration from four West African countries (Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal), and Tiemoko (2004) has highlighted the important role of the family in all aspects of human, social and financial capital acquisition and investment through migration, also investigating West African case studies (Ghana, Ivory Coast).

Remittances, generally, keep increasing: Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)¹² have received \$501 billion in remittances in 2019, up from \$272 billion in 2009 (+84% in ten years); remit-

10 The term remittances may also include goods, ideas, knowledge etc. but in this handbook, we only refer to monetary transfers (Fackler et al., 2018).

11 “Private capital flows consist of net foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest [...] in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities” (World Bank, 2020e).


12 See Module 2 for background on these country classifications which are explained in UNDESA (n.d.).

tances received in low income countries (LICs) more than doubled from \$10 billion in 2009 to over \$21 billion by 2019 and they jumped in middle income countries (MICs) from \$263 billion (2009) to almost \$480 billion in 2019 (+82% in ten years; World Bank, 2020d). In percentage of GDP, remittances are particularly significant for LICs where they represent almost 4.3% of GDP in 2019, compared to 1.6% in LMICs and 1.5% in MICs (World Bank, 2020c). In South Sudan, for instance, remittances made up over 35% of the GDP, in Lesotho 21%, in The Gambia, Comoros, Senegal, Liberia between 10% and 15% of GDP. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, remittances represented a share of over 5% of GDP (data as of October 2020; World Bank, 2020f). Remittance flows generally show a mixed picture (see Figure 10).

When Covid-19 hit the world in 2019/2020, when borders were closed and the oil price dropped, a shockwave was sent to remittances-sending migrants, their receiving communities and countries. In April 2020, the World Bank sent a strong alert, expecting remittances to decrease by up to 20%, “the sharpest decline in recent history” (World Bank, 2020b, p. 7). As remittances alleviate poverty, the loss of financial support was expected to lead to further poverty and deprivation (World Bank, 2020b).

Noxolo (2016, p. 53) finds that the impact of remittances on poverty is considerably lower in Africa than in other contexts: A “10% increase in the share of remittances in GDP leads to an approximate 1% decrease in the poverty headcount ratio [in Africa while a study on] [...] the impact of remit-


Figure 9: Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries compared to ODA and FDI



Remittances are an important factor within the development-migration nexus as they benefit the receiving household or community directly. They alleviate poverty and/or support local investment. Remittances flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) exceed FDI and ODA. Source: World Bank (2018b, p. 3, Figure 1.1). Own illustration.

tances in developing Asian-Pacific countries found that a 10% increase in remittances leads to a 2.8 % decrease in poverty” (Noxolo, 2016, p. 53). The “smaller impact on poverty in Africa [...] is [primarily due to] the high cost of sending remittances to Africa” (Noxolo, 2016, p. 53). Remittance costs are of great concern in the migration-development nexus: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) address remittances in goal 10, target 10c, which aims to reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5% (United Nations, n.d.). The Global Compact for Migration calls for “faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants” (UN, 2020b, p. 6, pp. 27-29, Objective 20). The costs for sending money are high in developing countries and with 7.1 % in 2018 “well

Figure 10: A mixed picture for remittance flows (3-month moving average, December 2019=100)



While the World Bank estimated after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in April 2020 that remittances would fall by 20% in low- and middle-income countries, perhaps surprisingly, this did not materialize across the board. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 2020 reported that “remittances often hold up in response to adverse shocks in recipient countries”. This figure shows that remittances developed “in line with virus containment policies [in high income countries] where strict measures were put in place in March 2020” causing remittances to decline. When the strictness of the measures relaxed in May, remittances increased, in some cases way above the pre-pandemic level (Kenya, Mexico, Bangladesh, Pakistan). Source: Quayyum & Kpodar (2020). Own illustration.

above” the SDG target of 3% (World Bank, 2018b, p. 6). The cost in South Asia was the lowest in 2018, at 5.2%, while sub-Saharan Africa “had the highest average cost” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 6), at 9.4%, with surging costs across many African corridors (the reasons are e.g. low volumes of formal flows, inadequate penetration of new technologies). Intra-regional corridors are the most expensive: “The corridor connecting Angola to Namibia was the costliest [...] [21.4% in 2016-2017, and the cheapest with 2.9%] was Ivory Coast to Mali” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 34).

Institutions

Increasingly, the impact of institutions on migration decisions has been researched, presenting democratic institutions as a significant factor in attracting migrants. Baudassé et al. (2016, p. 25) argue that institutions are “fundamental” and “at the same level as economic factors” in explaining why people leave their origin country in favour of a destination country. Bertocchi & Strozzi (2008, p. 97), who analysed migration from Europe to the New World between 1870 and 1910 with a view to current developments, found evidence that democratic countries with related institutions were associated with higher rates of migration. In this line of thought, institutions relevant to migration comprise political (e.g. constitution, civil rights, participation), social (protection, income redistribution, informal solidarity etc.) and economic (e.g. property rights, entrepreneurship versus corruption as signs of weak institutions) aspects (Baudassé et al., 2016, p. 6). Bertocchi & Strozzi (2008, p. 83) differentiate the impact of institutions that can attract migrants, such as citizenship and land and education policies from the impact of political institutions.



SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING AS WELL AS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Invite participants to look into “perceptions of well-being” as per the indicators shown in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2019b, pp. 30-33) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2019) and use these sources to:

- Collect data for your country or a country of your choice: Review human development indicators like “freedom of choice”, and perceptions about government like “confidence in the judicial system”, “actions to preserve the environment” and “trust in national government”.
- Identify media reports for the country you selected that discuss issues of corruption and “well-being” of the population in view of the human development indicators.

Several studies found that particularly high-skilled citizens emigrate as corruption increases and the quality of democratic institutions decreases (Cooray & Schneider, 2016; Kirwin & Anderson, 2018).

Corruption, rampant in a number of African countries, is a signal of weak institutions. Ambitiously and aspirationally, the Africa Union designated 2018 the year of “Winning the Fight Against Corruption: A Sustainable Path to Africa’s Transformation” (Tankou, 2018). “Corruption continues to harm Africa, hampering democracy, development and the ability to bring people out of poverty”, Transparency International warns and posits that “[t]he impact of corruption cannot be underestimated. Roughly 43 per cent of Africans are living in poverty while over US\$50 billion worth of stolen assets flow out of Africa every year”. It observes that “[w]idespread lack of development [...] is reinforced by extensive corruption schemes, which scare off investors and discourage further development.” The NGO estimates that “[m]isappropriated funds account for a 25 per cent loss of development resources in Africa” (Transparency International, 2018).

Education

Education transforms individual lives and is key to social mobility. It is a central trigger for socio-economic change and hugely relevant for achieving the SDGs. Education is a prime value in the migration-development nexus, and, according to UNESCO, “a major driver in the decision to migrate” (UNESCO, 2019, p. xvii, pp. 2-4).

Of all world regions,¹³ UNESCO stipulates, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rates of education exclusion: Across the region, 9 million girls¹⁴ and 6 million boys between 6 and 11 years will never go to school at all (UIS, 2020). Attesting to the fact that over 20% of children in this age group are out of school in Africa, and about 60% of youth between 15 and 17 years, UNESCO alerts that “the situation will likely get worse as the region faces a rising demand for education due to a still-growing school-age population” (UIS, 2020). That warning was sent out prior to Covid-19, which exacerbated the situation. In sub-Saharan Africa, nationwide school closures due to the pandemic came at a time when a very large number of schools had already been closed because of severe insecurity, strikes or climatic hazards (AfricaNews, 2019; UN, 2020a; Yameogo & Tidey, 2019). The pupils’ presence at home requires families not only to compensate for school meals, and to facilitate learning, even more worrisome is the threat that, without support, they may never return to school.

While Africa has made significant advances in closing the gap in primary-level enrolments, in sub-Saharan Africa the numbers fall abruptly from officially 99% in primary schools via 43% in secondary schools and only 9% in tertiary education (World Bank & UIS, 2020a; World Bank & UIS, 2020b; World Bank & UIS, 2020c). Only 4% of children in Africa are expected to enter a graduate and postgraduate institution, compared to 14% in South and West Asia and 36% in Latin America (Musau, 2017-2018). Across the board, the quality of teaching and learning is a matter

¹³ For regional and country classifications, see Module 2 and UNDESA (n.d.).

¹⁴ Kaps et al. (2019) highlight the exceptionally important role of women’s education in the light of falling fertility rates: „Many experts believe that education is the best method of birth control“ (Kaps et al., 2019, p. 12).


of great concern (Sifuna & Sawamura, 2009). An example from one of the most developed sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, may illustrate the magnitude of the challenge: Almost 80 % of Grade 6 mathematics teachers “cannot get 60 % on a Grade 6/7 maths test” (Spaull, 2019, p. 3); most “teachers do not currently have the content knowledge or pedagogical skills necessary to impart the curriculum” (Spaull, 2019, p. 8). One of the countries registering low in the UNDP human development countries index, this handbook’s case study Guinea-Bissau (UNDP, 2019a, p. 302), exhibits a “dire situation” (Boone et al., 2013, title) whereby only 27 % of almost 10,000 surveyed children aged 7 to 17 years were able to add two single digits, and just about 20 % were able to read and comprehend a simple word (Boone et al., 2013).¹⁵

These challenges are being addressed in research on all matters of education in Africa, and sometimes the media report the issues (AU, 2020; News24, 2011; UN, 2020b; UN, 2020c).¹⁶ UNESCO’s report on “Migration, displacement and education” (2019) provides a comprehensive account on education considering migrants, refugees and host communities. The report outlines the issue from early childhood to adult education, from vocational training to university education and academic exchange programmes, addressing pupils, students, educators and comprising internal and international migrants as well as refugees. It shows that migration and forced displacement impacts education in places of origin and destination. For instance, in destination places, the education system needs to manage the new diversity in classrooms and to harmonize different educational levels of native and migrant or refugee learners, requiring better-prepared educators. In places of origin, the emigration of school-aged youth may deter investment in education and thereby reduce the opportunities for those who stay behind; the emigration of educated citizens (known as brain drain) takes the strongest performers away from home, yet, at the same time, may be partly offset in cases where migrants send money back home (see above section on remittances). These better educated people – who prompt the brain drain at home – are most likely to migrate (see Figure 11): Across 53 countries, the probability of migration effectively doubled among those with primary education, tripled among those with secondary and quadrupled among those with tertiary, compared with those with no education (UNESCO, 2019, p. 15). This said, refugees are also often semi-literate (15% of refugees in Germany are illiterate but are least likely to attend a literacy course; UNESCO, 2019, p. 183, Figure 13.3), and “among asylum seekers with primary education, only 50 % of those surveyed in Greece and 41 % in Italy had achieved minimum proficiency level in literacy” (UNESCO, 2019, p. 117, Figure 7.2).

¹⁵ See the rank of South Africa and Guinea-Bissau on the Human Development Index: UNDP (2019a, pp. 300-303). In South Africa, the teachers’ incapacity to get 100 % of the Grade 6/7 math test translates – according to nationally representative surveys – into over 60 % of Grade 5 learners being unable to add and subtract whole numbers, and they have no understanding of multiplication by one-digit numbers, e.g. they cannot do basic mathematics (Spaull, 2019).

¹⁶ See, for instance: Education is one of six guiding principles of the African Union’s Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2016-2025 (AU, 2020) with its very aspirational thoughts like “Africa’s education and training systems ... [will] meet the knowledge, competencies, skills, innovation and creativity required [...] at the national, sub-regional and continental levels”. Education is a cross-cutting theme in the Global Compact for Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees (paras 68 and 69) addresses education particularly in view of quality, reducing the gap time for refugee children between arrival and start of school and recognition of equivalency of academic and professional qualifications (UN, 2020b). See also the SDGs, especially SDG 4 (UN, 2020c).

Figure 11: The more educated are more likely to migrate (migration intensity rate by education, selected countries, five-year intervals, 1999-2010)



Globally, the more educated are more likely to leave their country, but the picture in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly pronounced. Source: UNESCO (2019, p. 16). Own illustration.

While some experts see education as a major driver in the decision to migrate, others describe education as just one among many socio-economic factors that aim at a better life (Browne, 2017). Exploring the reasons to consider migration, Afrobarometer (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 16, Table 1) reports that only a fraction of their respondents indicate that they wish to pursue an education (6%), considerably less than those who want to escape poverty or economic hardship (29%) and those who wish to find work (44%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 14, Figure 12). These categories are, however, closely related as economic aspirations and education go hand-in-hand, as Browne (2017, p. 2) explains. The author suggests that education becomes a factor for international migration at university level. University education is, in a global comparison, least affordable in sub-Saharan Africa and most affordable in Europe (UNESCO, 2019, pp. 148-149).

For sub-Saharan Africa, Klingholz et al. (2017) describe the lack of (quality) education as a main source of the many challenges: Young people will often be confined to making a living as simple labourers in agriculture or the informal sector. Education cannot be overestimated as a value proposition in the migration-development nexus. Kaps et al. (2019) explain that a “deficit of education and a lack of income opportunities are inhibiting economic development and thus making it difficult for people to escape the poverty trap” (Kaps et al. 2019, p. 6). To confront this risk with adequate interventions is challenging under normal conditions, let alone under Covid-19. Dreesen et al. (2020) show in a study for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) that tailor-made responses are required. Their study of school closures in over 120 countries concludes that there is no one-style-fits-all approach to deliver content for remote learning. In addition to large global inequities in access to the internet, TV and radio (just around 3% of households in countries like Guinea-Bissau have electricity), UNICEF recommends using multiple delivery channels. In Jordan, for instance, refugee children received learning packages; elsewhere, telecommunication companies did not charge data costs for education content and SD cards for mobile phones preloaded with audio content were delivered to families in hard-to-reach areas in Burundi; TV is used by most countries to deliver educational content.

The most vulnerable learners are also among those who have poor access to digital media and distance learning, and many are not fluent in the language of instruction (UN, 2020a, p. 7). The UN therefore uses very strong words of warning: “Preventing a learning crisis from becoming a generational catastrophe requires urgent action from all” (UN, 2020a, p. 3).


Climate change

The worsening impacts of climate change are expected to displace millions of people internally (raising numbers of IDPs) across three world regions – sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America. In the most pessimistic of three scenarios (high greenhouse gas emissions and unequal

development paths), by 2050 around 143 million people (3% of the aggregate population in these three regions), could be forced to escape from their homes to safer places in their home country. This projection on climate change, migration, forced displacement and development, published by the World Bank in a landmark study titled “Groundswell” (Rigaud et al., 2018; World Bank, 2018a), offers dire perspectives even in the best “climate friendly”-scenario that assumes improved development pathways. For sub-Saharan Africa, internal displacement due to climate change will increase under all three scenarios due to lower water availability and crop productivity alongside rising sea level and storm surges (World Bank, 2018a, p. 1; see Figure 12). By 2050, the total number of IDPs due to climate change “could be as high as 85.7 million or four percent of the region’s total population” under the pessimistic scenario, more than in South Asia and Latin America; the best case scenario (“climate friendly”) projects 28.3 million people being displaced (World Bank, 2018a, p. 2).

Theoretical and empirical research on climate change causing migration and forced displacement is manifold and has increased during the past three decades (Migration Data Portal, 2020c). At the time of writing this handbook in 2020, a literature review was published that offers a recent overview of the topic (Flavell et al., 2020). As outlined in the section on conflict (see above), the numbers of IDPs are larger than those who are displaced across borders (refugees), and garner

Figure 12: Projected total numbers and shares of internal climate migrants in sub-Saharan Africa under three scenarios by 2050



Source: World Bank (2018a, p. 2, Figure 1). Own illustration.

relatively little international attention. This also applies to people who are being displaced due to climate change. The IDMC laments that IDPs are “internally displaced but internationally disregarded” (Bilak, 2020). Even some standard international reference documents like the SDGs do not explicitly address this group (Zeender, 2018). Few sources in Africa make the issues public – for instance the Africa Portal’s “Climate Change and Migration in Africa”-series (2020) and occasional journalistic overviews (Fagan, 2019), to mention just two examples.

There is a consensus, “Groundswell” assures, that climate change-induced displacement within countries – rather than displacement across international borders – will continue to be by far “the larger phenomenon” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 2). Substantial development challenges are implied, and the report makes a strong case for “concerted action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, together with inclusive development policies and embedding climate migration into policy planning” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 1). In this line of thought, Klingholz et al. (2020) advocate for a re-orientation of Africa’s agricultural sector towards sustainability with more productivity in order to feed the growing population; the bases for this “great leap are research, development and dissemination of technical and social innovations, as well as knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship” (Klingholz et al., 2020, p. 67).

The “Groundswell” report refers to climate migrants, not to climate refugees. This editorial decision is in line with international law and UNHCR’s position to uphold the refugee definition.¹⁷ In public debate and even in the glossaries recommended by this handbook, the usage and definitions of terms varies – in use are, for instance, environmental migrants, climate refugees – and sometimes definitions even include people displaced after industrial accidents (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a; Ionesco et al., 2017; UNHCR, 2020a). This handbook refers to climate displacement, linking it to the fact that most people are displaced internally. Whatever words authors and institutions choose – they all agree that IDPs have acute humanitarian needs, vulnerabilities and need protection.

The dearth of data outlined in Module 2 on migration and forced displacement is even more pronounced regarding IDPs and particularly in view of people displaced by climate change. The IDMC reports for instance that displacement prompted by drought is grossly underestimated as data have only been available for a few countries since 2017 (André et al., 2019, p. 19). According to this source, disasters – natural hazards, excluding industrial accidents – triggered 2.6 million new displacements in 2018 and more than 21.2 million between 2009 and 2018. A total of 85% of all disaster displacement recorded in Africa since 2009 have been the result of floods. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth caused most devastating disasters in 2019, with 2.2 million people affected, and

¹⁷ Recall definitions discussed in Module 2. A “refugee” is defined as a person who has crossed an international border “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” according to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

617,000 newly displaced in Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Madagascar (André et al., 2019, p. 19, p. 24). The development news organisation “The New Humanitarian” shares impressions of Praia Nova, a shanty town in Mozambique’s port city of Beira that was the first to be struck by cyclone Idai. The neighbourhood of around 500,000 people was largely destroyed. Families are still torn between staying at home in emergency shelter, hoping for reconstruction, and relocating to new settlements supported by the government and aid groups in villages away from low-lying, flood-prone areas (Kleinfeld, 2019).

The “Groundswell” report concludes that internal climate displacement “will likely rise through 2050 and then accelerate unless there are significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and robust development action” (Rigaud et al., 2018, p. xix).

Co-ethnic networks (diaspora)

Research on networks and migration often assumes that individuals are more likely to migrate to places where they have many connections. This is true but it is not the whole story. Larger networks may actually deter migration, for instance if migrants compete with one another over opportunities and resources and sense some rivalry over information sharing (Blumenstock et al., 2019, pp. 2-3), or when they are disillusioned over a lack of peer protection (Kuschminder, 2016).

Networks of co-ethnic community members, family and friends at home and abroad have, however, been identified as key drivers for migration. People are indeed more likely to go to places where they know other migrants who have recently moved there, and these networks play an exceptional role in providing support (material, social) and as a source of information from the planning stage, during the journey and at the destination by facilitating, and even influencing destination country decisions (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, pp. 21-22). As Blumenstock et al. (2019) found for the example of Rwanda, the social network of a single migrant is extensive.

As important as the co-ethnic network is in the destination, the family and kin at home is the decision making entity, sending their members off on regular or irregular paths to migration, often facilitated by the use of social media (Cummings et al., 2015; Fleischer, 2006; Migration Data Portal, 2020b; Simpson, 2017). For them, equipping their trusted community member with funds and sending her or him abroad, is often seen as a family risk diversification strategy.

As indicated earlier, this selection of context factors is a non-inclusive presentation. Journalism educators using this handbook will hopefully find inspiration to invite their classes to critically reflect on these and other context factors; it is hoped that they will contribute to complete the picture by revealing their country perspective.



SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING BY PRESENTING THEM IN JOURNALISTIC WORK:

Invite participants to summarize the course on context factors in a 2-page paper, using as case studies either their home country or a country of choice. Allow students to choose between two topics and ask them to explain the theory and base their research on a body of academic literature.

Topic 1: Additional context factors for migration

Explain the theory outlined in this module and describe which context factor(s) on migration are relevant to your country – or the country of your choice – and why. In addition, think of any relevant push or pull factors that have not been introduced in this module and argue why it is/they are important.

- Recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting matters of migration and forced displacement by reviewing the media coverage of one media outlet in the country of your choice over a week (select a week with sizable coverage): Trace which push/pull factors were covered.
- Identify those context factors that bring together migrants and refugees in mixed flows.
- Contextualize the context factors and present them in a 2-page paper.

Topic 2: Refugees in situations of multiple risks

Refugees are persecuted at home and have to flee across borders. Because they are persecuted, they are subjected to additional challenges that, at first sight, may appear like push factors for migration, for instance the lack of employment opportunities. Take a women journalist as an example and describe her multiple risks and challenges in your home country or a country of your choice. Choose from life stories collected by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2020).

- Explain the theory and base your research on the body of academic literature.
- Recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting about women refugees: What are their specific risks?
- Contextualize push/pull factors by exploring how women refugees are presented in the media. Reviewing the media coverage of women in a media outlet of your choice over a month (select a month with sizable coverage): How are women as refugees presented, and are they listened to?
- Identify context factors for women refugees and describe how they are sometimes in mixed flows together with migrants.

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GENDER

by Monika Lengauer

The terms *gender* and *sex* should not be – but are being – used interchangeably. Gender describes the characteristics of women, men or some other identity, which are socially constructed, while sex refers to those that are biologically determined (or sex is “a categorization based on the appearance of the genitalia at birth” (LGBT Resource Center, n.d.)). Gender identity and gender roles also determine the experiences of women, girls, men, boys and members of the LGBTI-group as migrants and refugees. In data collection, however, gender and sex are not only frequently used synonymously but gender often equates to women only; in addition, data are hardly ever disaggregated by LGBTI identification (Migration Data Portal, 2020). Sex-disaggregated data at minimum are critical for evidence-based policymaking and planning, and the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees are committed to improve these inadequacies (Hennebry & Petrozziello, 2019; UN, 2018; UNGA, 2018). Concluding from the fragmented data available, women account for around 50% of all forcibly displaced persons – refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) or stateless populations (UNHCR, 2020)¹. The share of women in international mobility has not changed significantly in recent decades but more women migrants are moving independently for work, education and as heads of households (Migration Data Portal, 2020).

The research field of gender and migration is as well established as the research field on gender and forced displacement². Regarding migration studies, “scholars now insist that migration itself is a gendered phenomenon and requires more sophisticated theoretical and analytical tools than studies of sex roles” (Donato et al., 2018, p. 6-7). Refugee studies have researched gender issues from a broad spectrum, including the exploration of legal and moral grounds for individuals to receive asylum and protection from gender-related persecution (Gerver & Millar, 2013). In their edited collection of gender, violence and refugees, Buckley-Zistel and Krause (2019) not only elaborate on these and other concepts but also allow insights into a wide spectrum of case studies – including LGBTI – from Angola in Southern Africa to Sweden in Northern Europe.

In human mobility, gender has arguably “the biggest impact” on the experiences of women, girls, men, boys and people identifying as members of the LGBTI (Migration Data Portal, 2020). Gender influences motives, routes and networks people use, experiences, reception, opportunities, restrictions and vulnerabilities at home, in transit and in destination countries shape debates in the media and policies (Schrover & Moloney, 2013). There are, obviously, many differences between these groups while women, men and members of the LGBTI group may be confronted with specific


1 Women account for around 48% of the international migrant stock. Note that “[s]tocks include all foreign-born residents in a country regardless of when they entered the country”. These data can therefore not be compared with UNHCR data on forcibly displaced persons. See Migration Data Portal theme page “Gender and Migration” for data sources (Migration Data Portal, 2020).

2 Literature reviews show the scope of both fields, for instance Fleury (n.d.) or Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (2020).

or shared vulnerabilities and may all be exposed to forms of gender-based violence. Research – for instance, the previously quoted edited collection by Buckley-Zistel & Krause (2019), institutions and the media have made public horrific crimes of sexual violence and abuse. “Women on the run” is a study conducted by the UNHCR in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico revealing “epidemic levels of violence” that have “surpassed governments’ abilities to protect victims” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 2) in large parts of the countries, and where women flee from murder, extortion, and rape. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced displacement following rape in conflict contexts, and The Washington Post newspaper has shown the rebels’ denial about their human rights abuses (Wilén & Ingelaere, 2017).

Women face specific discrimination and are subjected to explicit vulnerabilities as migrants and refugees, particularly in human trafficking (see Figure 13). Human trafficking is a crime.³ It broadly follows routes and patterns of migration and forced displacement. According to the UNODC’s 2018

Figure 13: Shares of detected victims of trafficking in persons in subregions recording diverse patterns, 2016 (or more recent)



The UNODC study reports abduction of women and girls for sexual slavery and for forced marriage in many conflicts in Central and West Africa and in Middle East (UNODC, 2018, p. 12). Source: UNODC, 2018, p. 10. Own illustration.

3 “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” Source: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (IOM, 2019, p. 213).

global report on human trafficking, “women represent the vast majority of the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, and 35% of the victims trafficked for forced labour” are women and girls (UNODC, 2018, p. 10). The report points to “considerable regional differences in the sex and age profiles of detected trafficking victims. [...] In West Africa, most of the detected victims are children, both boys and girls, while in South Asia, victims are equally reported to be men, women and children” (UNODC, 2018, p. 10). In Central Asia, a larger share of adult men is trafficked than in other parts of the world; in Central America and the Caribbean, more girls are recorded (UNODC, 2018, p. 10).

Women escaping from conflict situations are particularly vulnerable. The need to take urgent action has been recognized by the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, who were awarded “for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict” (Nobel Price Committee, 2018). Denis Mukwege, a surgeon from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “has treated thousands of victims of sexual violence in armed conflicts, and has criticized governments for not doing enough to stop the use of sexual violence against women as a strategy and weapon of war” (Nobel Price Committee, 2018). Nadia Murad founded “Nadia’s Initiative” (Nadia’s Initiative, 2020), a non-profit organization dedicated to rebuilding communities in crisis and advocating globally for survivors of sexual violence. The NGO currently focuses on re-developing the Yazidi homeland in Sinjar (Iraq), where Nadia Murad grew up. ISIS terrorists had destroyed her village, killed, enslaved and raped community members (Arraf, 2019; Marczak, 2018; Nobel Price Committee, 2018).

“The international protection regime is failing refugee women and girls”, wrote the Forced Migration Research Network, University of New South Wales, in their contribution to the UNHCR participatory process leading up to the Global Compact on Refugees (Bartolomei et al., 2017). The authors also inferred that being vulnerable as a woman does not equate to being “inherently vulnerable” nor being a passive victim or a helpless aid beneficiary. Krause (2020) shows this in her research on Uganda, recognizing women as “social actors”, and also “actors in the refugee regime”. In a photo essay, UN Women presents women refugees as empowered despite their lives in refugee camps (UN Women, 2016).

Women journalists as refugees and as migrants are underreported from almost every angle, maybe with a few exceptions, such as the Missouri School of Journalism that produces the *Global Journalist* portraying journalists in exile (Global Journalist, 2020) and Reporters Without Borders (2019) as well as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2020), to name but a few. The *Refugees Deeply* site, hosted on The New Humanitarian website, has a special story on women journalism refugees from Libya (Nallu, 2016).

Fleury (n.d.) reveals in a literature review on women and migration how varied the field is and how many different empirical studies have shed light on different aspects. The “state of gender and

migration studies is fundamentally healthy [...] [with a] veritable tidal wave since the late 1980s of research”, posit Donato et al. (2018, pp. 6-7).

In the subfield of migration and development, remittances that women send home tell newsworthy stories hidden in sex-disaggregated data. Azam et al. (2020) conclude from a small study covering eleven countries⁴ that migrant women are remitting substantial portions of their earnings, sending as much or even more than men. This study seems to confirm previous research which shows migrant women in Spain remitted 38.5% of their incomes compared to men who remitted 14.5% (Fleury, n.d., p. 14). These patterns of women’s remittances occur despite a global gender pay gap whereby they are paid on average 20% less than men and despite women-specific preferences in money transfer modes: Women reportedly prefer to use money transfer businesses whereas men use mobile money transfer technology more often. This trend has been explained by the persistent digital gender divide and women’s lower digital literacy. Women are reported to remit smaller amounts but more frequently, which results in higher costs for them (Azam et al., 2020, p. 4; Fleury, n.d., p. 15). At the receiving end, several studies have shown that women use the money to improve the welfare of their families; they invest it in health and education whereas men receiving remittances are more likely to purchase assets (Fleury, n.d., p. 15). Women are at the core of the development process, and investments in the educational sector are urgently required because education “is a prime factor in reducing fertility rates, whereby women’s education is particularly impactful” (Kaps et al., 2019, p. 12).

Another difference between migrant women and men is the segregation in labour migration. Men tend to work in production or construction. Migrant women generally work as domestic workers or caretakers, in both low-skilled as well as in high-skilled employment – low-skilled women workers are mostly domestic helpers and caretakers, high-skilled women are for instance those in nursing positions (Fleury, n.d., pp. 10-11). Women migrant workers are often exposed to abuse, at work as well as in their homes, as Hiralal (2017) has documented for migrant women in South Africa. “It is critical that we put an end to gender-blind migration governance”, petitions UN Women, which also recalls the key UN human rights treaty bodies addressing the linkages between gender and migration, including the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR; von Hase, 2017).

4 The study is not representative and is limited in scope in that it refers to national household surveys from 11 countries where the sex of remittance senders is included as a variable in the database along with the value of remittances received from the sender. The 11 countries are 6 sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania), three South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal) and two countries from Eastern Europe/Central Asia (Albania and Tajikistan; Azam et al., 2020, p. 4).



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Academic/Journalistic:

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Institutional:

Migration Data Portal (2020). *Gender and migration*. Retrieved December 20, 2020, from <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/gender>

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